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MORTON v. MANCARI: NEW VITALITY FOR THE
INDIAN PREFERENCE STATUTES
Brian Douglas Baird

In Morton v. Mancari1 the Supreme Court significantly clarified
the unique relationship between the federal government and the

American Indian. Through a unanimous decision the Court turned
back a major challenge to the validity of existing Indian Preference
Statutes and illuminated Congress' unique obligation toward the tribal
Indian in American society.2 The Supreme Court definitively determined that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 did not
repeal the Indian Preference Statutes; moreover, it determined that this
Indian preference does not constitute invidious racial discrimination in
violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.

This note will proceed from a brief statement of the facts and
holdings in this case to a short background of the federal policy of
granting hiring preferences to Indians in the Indian Service.

Subse-

quent sections will offer a critical analysis of the two primary issues
raised in this case and will discuss the practical effects and implications
of this important decision.

The Indian Reorganization Act of 19343 provided for an employment preference in the Bureau, of Indian Affairs for all Indians who
qualified under BIA regulations.4

While there are earlier preference

1. 94 S. Ct. 2474 (1974).
2. The validity of the Indian Preference Statutes has never before been challenged.
These statutes have been construed however. See Freeman v. Morton, 499 F.2d 494
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (preference held to apply to lateral transfers as well as to hiring and
promotions); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Hickel, 432 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 981 (1971) (preference held inappl~cable to reduction in force).
3. For a general discussion of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, see Note,
Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MiCu. L. Rv.
955 (1972).
4. Eligibility criterion are found in 44 BIAM 335, 3.1:
An Indian has preference in appointment in the Bureau. To be eligible
for preference in appointment, promotion, and training, an individual must be
one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a member of a Federally-recog-
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statutes of limited scope, 5 the broad sweep of section 472 of title 25
now controls this area of Indian employment preference. Section 472
(originally enacted as section 12 of the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934) provides:
The Secretary of the Interior is directed to establish standards
of health, age, character, experience, knowledge, and ability
for Indians who may be appointed, without regard to civilservice laws, to the various positions maintained, now or
hereafter, by the Indian Office, in the administration of functions or services affecting any Indian tribe. Such qualified
Indians shall hereafter have the preference to appointment
to vacancies in any such positions.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs has subsequently issued a directive
extending the application of this Indian preference beyond the initial
hiring stage to include interagency promotional situations. 6
Appellees, non-Indian BIA employees, instituted a class action on
behalf of themselves and other non-Indian employees similarly situated.
nized tribe. It is the policy for promotional consideration that where two or
more candidates who meet the established qualification requirements are available for filing a vacancy, if one of them is an Indian, he shall be given preference in filling the vacancy. In accordance with the policy statement approved
by the Secretary, the Commissioner may grant exceptions to this policy by approving the selection and appointment of non-Indians, when he considers it in
the best interest of the Bureau.
This program does not restrict the right of management to fill positions
by methods other than through promotion. Positions may be filled by transfers, reassignment, reinstatement, or initial appointment.
5. 25 U.S.C. § 45 (1963) (originally enacted as Act of June 30, 1834, § 9, 4 Stat.
737):
In all cases of the appointments of interpreters or other persons employed
for the benefit of the Indians, a preference shall be given to persons of Indian
descent, if such can be found, who are properly qualified for the execution of
the duties.
25 U.S.C. § 46 (1963) (originally enacted as Act of May 17, 1882, § 6, 22 Stat.
88, and Act of July 4, 1884, § 6, 23 Stat. 97) (preference in Indian Service employment of clerical, mechanical and other help); 25 U.S.C. § 44 (1963) (originally enacted
as Act of August 15, 1894, § 10, 28 Stat. 313) (preference for employment of herders,
teamsters, and laborers); 25 U.S.C. § 274 (1963) (originally enacted as Act of June
7, 1897, § 1, 30 Stat. 83) (preference in employment of matrons, farmers, and industrial teachers in Indian schools); 25 U.S.C. § 47 (1963) (originally enacted as Act of
June 25, 1910, § 23, 36 Stat. 861) (general preference as to Indian labor and products
of Indian industry).
6. The Court cited BIA Personnel Management Letter No. 72-12 (1972) which
states in part:
The Secretary of the Interior announced today [June 23, 1972] he has
approved the Bureau's policy to extend Indian preference to training and to
filling vacancies by original appointment, reinstatement, and promotion. ...
The new policy provides as follows: Where two or more candidates who meet
the established qualification requirements are available for filling a vacancy,
if one of them is an Indian, he shall be given preference in filling the vacancy.
This new policy is effective immediately and is incorporated into all existing
programs such as the promotion program ...
The Court's opinion in Mancari did not address promotional preference.
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They alleged specifically that the Indian Preference Statutes were
implicitly repealed by the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act
and that such employment preferences constituted racial discrimination
in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.7
The three-judge district court, from which this case was appealed,
determined that section 11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 19728 did repeal the preference statutes. While the district court
made clear that it based its decision on an interpretation of the 1972
Act, the court also asserted that the Indian Preference Statutes must
fail on constitutional grounds.
Relying primarily on an interpretation of legislative intent, the
Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision regarding the scope
and application of the 1972 Act. Significantly, the Court also found
section 472 to be constitutionally valid.
The Indian Preference Statutes, which date back to 1834, provide
a preference to tribal Indians for employment in the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. Subsequent to the first such statute in 1834, Congress has recurrently enacted various preference statutes, including preferences for
the employment of clerical, mechanical, and other help on reservations,
the employment of herders, teamsters, and laborers in the Indian Service, and the employment of matrons, farmers and industrial teachers
in Indian schools. 9 Though the earlier preference statutes have no
documented history, the congressional objectives behind these unique
statutes can be gleaned from an examination of the legislative history
accompanying the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
The records of the House and Senate Committee Hearings on
Indian Affairs reveal vigorous expressions detailing the necessity for
the Indian Preference Statutes. 10 Such preferences were found to be
vital in according Indians greater participation in their own self-government; moreover, they were deemed necessary to fulfill the trust obliga7. Appellees' theory of attack is legitimized by Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954), which established that racial discrimination may be so arbitrary and unreasonable that it violates the fifth amendment's due process clause. Thus, a governmental
act which would violate the 14th amendment's equal protection clause, if taken by a
state, might be held to violate the due process clause if taken by the federal government.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. 11, 1973).
9. Statutes cited note 5.
10. For pertinent congressional expressions favoring the Indian Preference Statutes
see, S. REP. No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before
the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1934); Hearings on S.
2755 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 256 (1934); 78
CoNG. Rac. 9270 (1934) (remarks of Senator Hastings), 11123 (remarks of Senator
Wheeler), 11727, 11729, 11731-32 (remarks of Representative Howard).
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tion due the American Indian and to neutralize the harmful effect upon
the Indian Nations of an unsympathetic non-Indian controlled Bureau
of Indian Affairs.
Senator Wheeler, a co-sponsor of the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934, expressed the reason for a preference this way:
We are setting up in the United States a civil service rule
which prevents Indians from managing their own property.
It is an entirely different service from anything else in the
United States because these Indians own this property. It
belongs to them. . . 11

This statement illustrates the nature of the unprecedented political
relationship existing between the federal government and the American tribal Indian. It is because of this unique relationship that Congress sought to provide a favorable atmosphere within which the
political and economic self-determination of the Indian Nations could
be realized. Congress believed such an atmosphere could be created
by an Indian dominated Bureau of Indian Affairs; thus, the BIA was
envisaged as an agency which would be controlled by, and would truly
represent the interests of, the American Indian.
Summing up the need for the Indian preference, Congressman
Howard, a co-sponsor of the 1934 Act, declared:
It should be possible for Indians to enter the service of their
own people without running the gauntlet of competition with
whites for these positions. Indian progress and ambition will
be enormously strengthened as soon as we adopt the principle that the Indian Service shall gradually become in fact
as well as in name, an Indian service predominantly in the
hands of educated and competent Indians. 12
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 provided the
focus for appellees' attack on the Indian Preference Statutes. In
slightly amended form, this Act carried over and applied to the federal
government the substantive anti-discrimination law contained in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.13 The specific provision of the
1972 Act used by appellees was section 2000e-16(a), which provides
as follows:
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for
11. Hearings on S. 2755 and S. 3645 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 256 (1934).
12. 78 CONG. REC. 11731 (1934).
13. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964), prohibited discrimination in private employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,

or national origin.
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employment . . . in military departments . . . in executive
agencies . . . in the United States Postal Service . . . and

in those units of the legislative and judicial branches of the
Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, and in the Library of Congress shall be made free from
any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 4
In reaching the conclusion that the Indian Preference Statutes
were not controlled by the anti-discrimination language of section
2000e-16(a), the Supreme Court first scrutinized the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The Court noted that the 1964 Act specifically exempted
from its effect the employment preference for Indians by Indian tribes
or by industries located on or near Indian reservations."; This Title
VII exemption, the Court asserted, disclosed congressional recognition
of the unique legal status of tribal activities. Since the anti-discrimination provisions of the 1964 Act were carried over and applied to the
federal government by the 1972 Act, and since there was no other
mention of Indian preference in the legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act; the Court concluded that Congress had not
altered its approval of Indian employment preferences in specific areas.
In light of the fact that Congress had not modified the Indian exceptions
found in the 1964 Act, the Supreme Court found it unreasonable to
conclude that, through the 1972 Act, Congress intended to eliminate
longstanding BIA preference statutes while allowing the continuance
of an Indian preference in private employment situations. The Court
thus refused to attribute to Congress the irrationality and arbitrariness
asserted by appellees.
In further support of their position that Congress had intended to
exclude the Indian Preference Statutes from the effect of section
2000e-16(a), the Supreme Court pointed out that three months after
the 1972 Act was passed Congress enacted two new Indian preference
laws."e These statutes, which require that Indians be given preference
14. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 11, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)
(Supp. II, 1973).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and 2000e-2(i). Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian
tribes from the Act's definition of who constitutes an employer. Section 20OOe-2(i)
states:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced
employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential
treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near
a reservation.
16. Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. H9 887c(a), (d), 1119a (Supp. II,
1973).
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in governmental programs which train teachers of Indian children,
made it increasingly improbable, it was reasoned, that Congress
intended to repeal section 472 through the implementation of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.
Finally, the Supreme Court upheld the integrity of section 472 by
using several rules of statutory interpretation. The general rule, that
repeals by implication are not favored, was found to militate against
the repeal of section 472.17 In addition, the Court applied the rule
that, in the absence of congressional intent to the contrary, two statutes
capable of co-existence should both be regarded as effective.' 8 With
reference to this latter interpretive guide, the Court found that the
special employment preferenc of the BIA could readily co-exist with
the more general rule prohibiting employment discrimination found in
Title VII.
It is important to note that behind the Court's carefully reasoned
decision in this case lies the strong conviction that a different conclusion
would have disregarded not only the history and purpose of the preference statutes but also the unique legal relationship between the federal
government and the American Indian Nations. The history and purpose of the preference statutes, as previously discussed, and the
peculiar relationship between Indians and the federal government
strongly influenced the Court. This unique relationship is more fully
examined during the Court's discussion of the constitutional issues
raised in this case.
Though the district court mentioned merely in passing that it could
have based its decision on constitutional grounds, the Supreme Court
squarely addressed appellees' contention that the preference in section
472 constituted invidious racial discrimination in violation of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. The Court maintained that this
issue could be resolved through the interaction of two factors-the first
being the unique legal status of federally recognized Indian tribes
under federal law, and the second being the plenary power of Congress
to legislate with regard to these Indian tribes.
The Court had characterized the nature and origin of the Indian's
unique legal status in Board of County Commissioners v. Seber:
In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the United
States overcame the Indians and took possession of -their
17. For the development of this rule see Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
336, 342-43, 363 (1842); Posedas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1963).
18. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
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lands, sometimes by force, leaving them an uneducated, helpless and dependent people needing protection against the selfishness of others and their own improvidence. Of necessity,
the United States assumed the duty of furnishing that protection, and with it the authority to do all that was required to
perform that obligation and to prepare the Indians to take
their place as independent, qualified members of the modem
body politic. 19
The Court has reaffirmed the duty described by this passage and contended that this serious commitment would be in jeopardy if the Indian
Preference Statutes were found to be unconstitutional.20
In finding section 472 to be constitutionally valid, Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, maintained that the plenary power of
Congress to legislate such Indian Preference Statutes is based upon a
history of treaties and the assumption of a "guardian-ward" status.
Justice Blackmun further stated that this power is drawn explicitly and
implicitly from the Constitution through article I, section 8, clause 3,
which provides power to "regulate commerce . . . with the Indian

tribes," and through the treaty power of article II. He pointed out that
the reference in article I to the regulation of commerce with the Indian
tribes singles out Indians as the proper subject for separate legislation,
and thus lays the groundwork for other legislation peculiar to the tribal
Indian.
While the Court found that Congress had the duty and the
authority to create special legislation for the American Indian, it
stopped short of characterizing the recipients of the Indian preference
as a racial group. Though appellees asserted that the classification
created by section 472 was racial in nature, the Supreme Court found
instead that this classification created a legitimate nonracial employment criterion. The Indians to whom this preference applied were
found to be affected, not as members of a specific racial group, but
rather as components of quasi-sovereign tribal entities uniquely governed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Had a racial classification been found, the charge that it was therefore inherently unreasonable and constitutionally invalid would have
been more difficult to rebut. 2 1 The Court instead found a nonracial
classification, a conclusion which is open to question. The Court's sole
19. 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943).
20. See Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808, 814 n.13 (E.D. Wash.
1965), affd, 384 U.S. 209 (1966).
21. See Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16
(1958); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-5 (1941).
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clarification of this point was the observation that since this classification
includes only Indians of at least one quarter blood who are also members of federally recognized tribes, certain Indians not belonging to
such tribes would be excluded from the class. This fine distinction provides the lone rationale for the Court's finding that a nonracial
classification was created.
After finding the Indian preference to be political in nature rather
than racial, the Court easily found a compelling governmental interest
as the basis for this particular classification; it further found a reasonable relationship between the classification trait and the purpose of the
statute. The important governmental interest involved was the encouragement of Indian self-government, which purpose was reasonably
furthered by Indian control of the BIA.
The Supreme Court thus upheld the constitutionality of the Indian
Preference Statutes by finding the classification created thereby to be
consistent with the mandates of due process, and by determining that
Congress had both the constitutional authority and a grave commitment
to protect and provide for tribal Indians through such legislation.
While the Supreme Court in Morton v. Mancari offered a persuasive argument for the exemption of the Indian Preference Statutes from
the effect of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, the lasting
significance of this case is to be found in the Court's response to the
constitutional challenge presented. In its response the Court showed
a keen appreciation for the historical perspective within which Indian
legislation must be viewed. In addition, the Court gave substance to
the subtle and illusive status of the American Indian in the eyes of the
law as it acknowledged the exceptional nature of the Indian preference
under examination. In this regard the Court declared: "In the sense
that there is no other group of people favored in this manner, the legal
22
status of the BIA is truly sui generis."1
Because of the novel and specific nature of the issues dealt with
in Morton v. Mancari, the application of the Supreme Court's reasoning
in this case to other areas of the law or to other racial groups is severely
limited. It should be remembered that the Court addressed itself
solely to one specific class of individuals to be employed by a unique
federal agency; therefore, this decision affects no other agency or group
of individuals.
The Supreme Court consummated its effort to define the contours
22. 94 S. Ct. 2474, 2484 (1974).
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of the relationship between the tribal Indian and the federal government by creating a lasting standard with which to judge congressional
action offering special treatment to Indians. This standard, which sets
the permissible constitutional limits for such treatment, is satisfied if the
special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress'
unique obligation toward the Indians. More important than setting
such a standard, the Court in Morton v. Mancari has offered an
unprecedented insight into the nature and substance of this solemn
obligation.
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